Kang Muslim
As the United States approached the politically charged environment of the 2026 midterm elections, widespread apprehensions gripped media outlets, political analysts, and everyday citizens alike. Pervasive public discourse frequently suggested that unrelenting partisan friction, compounded by recent instances of government-initiated force and high-profile societal flashpoints, would inevitably trigger an escalation in political violence. However, empirical findings from a newly released nationwide survey reveal a starkly contrasting reality: public support for political violence in the United States actually decreased heading into the 2026 midterms.
The comprehensive research, published as a preprint on SocArXiv and awaiting formal peer review, indicates that an overwhelming majority of American adults unconditionally reject the employment of physical force to advance ideological or political objectives. Led by Dr. Garen J. Wintemute—a distinguished professor of emergency medicine, the Baker-Teret Chair in Violence Prevention, and director of the Centers for Violence Prevention at the University of California, Davis—the research project provides a vital empirical counterweight to prevailing assumptions of societal fracturing. Despite high levels of affective polarization, the data suggest that the American public maintains a resilient and widespread aversion to violent political engagement.
Chronology and Research Methodology: Tracking a Longitudinal Trend
To understand the trajectory of political violence attitudes over time, Dr. Wintemute and his interdisciplinary research team established an annual, nationally representative survey project in 2022. The initiative was designed to systematically monitor shifting public sentiment regarding the justification of, and personal willingness to commit, political violence.
The baseline for this monitoring began in the wake of intensifying political polarization following the COVID-19 pandemic and the 2020 election cycle. Subsequent waves of the survey captured shifting public moods year after year. Notably, a 2024 study documented an initial nationwide decline in support for political violence and a diminishing belief in an imminent civil war between 2022 and 2023, signaling early resilience in public norms.
Building on these longitudinal insights, the research team administered the fifth wave of the survey online between May 15 and June 15, 2026. The sample comprised 7,752 adult participants meticulously drawn from the Ipsos KnowledgePanel, a probability-based panel engineered to accurately reflect the demographic, geographic, and socioeconomic makeup of the noninstitutionalized U.S. population.
The survey instrument was meticulously structured to evaluate three core concepts: respondent anticipations of a future civil war, moral justifications for utilizing political violence, and personal readiness to actively participate in violent acts. To ensure absolute clarity, the survey explicitly defined violence as physical force strong enough to cause physical pain or injury to an individual. Participants were evaluated across 53 distinct survey items, measuring nuances ranging from general attitudes to specific target populations, including elected officials, law enforcement personnel, election workers, and members of opposing political parties.
Supporting Data: Unpacking the 2026 Findings
The empirical results of the mid-2026 survey paint a reassuring picture of civic stability, running counter to alarmist narratives often amplified by sensationalized media coverage and poorly structured public opinion polls. Previous methodological analyses, such as a landmark 2022 study published in PNAS, highlighted that flawed survey designs routinely inflate apparent support for partisan violence by failing to distinguish between rhetorical venting and genuine willingness to commit harm.
By utilizing rigorous, carefully framed questions, the UC Davis research team uncovered a broad-based retreat from political violence. Out of the 53 survey items tracking attitudes toward violence, 51 demonstrated small, statistically significant average decreases between mid-2025 and mid-2026.
Key statistical highlights from the 2026 survey data include:
- Marginal Justification Rates: The belief that violence was "usually or always" justified to advance any specific political objective never exceeded 13 percent of the sample population.
- Absolute Rejection: Nearly one-quarter of all respondents stated that violence was never justified for any of the 21 specific political goals listed—which included preserving an American way of life, stopping police violence, preventing voter fraud, or curtailing illegal immigration. Among this group, over 91 percent explicitly clarified that their rejection of violence was absolute and unconditional.
- Extremely Low Personal Willingness: Among the subset of respondents who indicated that political violence could be at least sometimes justified, only about 2 percent reported being "very or completely willing" to personally damage property, threaten people, injure someone, or kill someone to achieve a political objective.
- Firearm Reticence: Fewer than 4 percent of all survey participants expressed any expectation that they would shoot or threaten someone with a firearm to advance a political goal.
- Civil War Perceptions: The sole metric that registered an increase from 2025 to 2026 was public expectation regarding the potential for a civil war. In 2025, 7.1 percent of respondents strongly agreed that a civil war would occur within the next few years; by 2026, that figure ticked upward to 8.0 percent. However, the foundational belief that a civil war was actively necessary to "set things right" remained flat at under 4 percent.
Ideological Nuances and Political Demographics
While the overarching trend points toward a nationwide decline in support for violence, the researchers conducted detailed subgroup analyses to understand how these attitudes manifest across the political spectrum.
Previous research from the team—notably a study covered by PsyPost in 2025—identified that individuals identifying as "Make America Great Again" (MAGA) Republicans were statistically more likely to view political violence as justified compared to other Americans, though they were not necessarily more inclined to personally execute such actions.
The 2026 data reaffirmed these ideological divergences. MAGA Republicans and non-Republican MAGA supporters consistently reported higher levels of theoretical justification for political violence than Democrats and non-MAGA Republicans. For example, roughly half of MAGA-affiliated respondents considered violence justified to advance at least one political objective. Furthermore, among the tiny fraction of respondents willing to actually engage in violence, non-Republican MAGA supporters expressed the highest relative willingness to target specific populations.
Despite these observable disparities, Dr. Wintemute emphasized that the downward trajectory in support for violence held true across nearly all political factions. "We found, as others have, that support for political violence is generally stronger on the political right than on the political left," Wintemute explained. "Willingness to commit political violence is another matter; it is rare across the board. The vast majority of respondents in our surveys reject political violence altogether, and most of those who consider it acceptable are not willing to become involved in it themselves."
Official Reactions, Expert Analysis, and Broader Implications
The publication of these findings has prompted considerable discussion among sociologists, political scientists, and public policy experts. Rather than viewing the American electorate as a powder keg inevitably hurtling toward unrest, the data suggest that democratic norms remain remarkably robust at the grassroots level.
In an official statement accompanying the research release, the study authors underscored the profound influence of public norms in shaping societal behavior. "These findings are clear," the authors wrote. "Entrapment in a spiral of escalating political violence is not inevitable in the United States. Those who promote political violence should recognize that they do not have the public’s support and that promoting violence may exact a political cost."
The researchers issued a direct call to action for civic leadership and everyday citizens, arguing that active social signaling can deter extremist behavior. "We who reject political violence must make our rejection known to our families, friends, and larger social networks," the team added. "A public climate of non-acceptance for violence can help reduce the likelihood of it occurring."
Independent political analysts have echoed these sentiments, noting that sensationalized depictions of polarization often distort public perception, leading citizens to overestimate the radicalism of their neighbors. By empirically demonstrating that the vast majority of Americans fundamentally abhor political violence, the study provides a stabilizing narrative that can empower community leaders, election officials, and journalists to counter fatalistic rhetoric.
Methodological Limitations and Future Directions
While the survey offers groundbreaking insights into national attitudes, the authors transparently outline several limitations inherent to polling on sensitive subjects. First, survey responses regarding hypothetical willingness to commit violence do not serve as infallible predictors of real-world behavior. Respondents may overstate their ideological dedication in a survey setting, or conversely, underreport aggressive intentions due to the profound social stigma attached to political violence.
Additionally, the survey design evaluated personal willingness to commit violence exclusively within the subset of respondents who first agreed that violence could theoretically be justified. Because different political groups passed this initial filter at varying rates, subsequent comparisons regarding personal willingness reflect differing sample proportions. For instance, because fewer Democrats met the initial criteria, follow-up percentages for that group represent a much smaller, highly specific subset of respondents. Finally, because the survey captured attitudes during a single month in mid-2026, rapidly developing national events or unforeseen political crises could potentially induce shifts in public sentiment.
Despite these methodological caveats, the research team is actively looking forward to translating observational data into actionable public policy. Dr. Wintemute announced that the UC Davis Centers for Violence Prevention plan to expand their efforts beyond monitoring. "Next year we hope to launch a randomized trial of an intervention to prevent political violence," Wintemute stated.
As the United States continues to navigate complex ideological landscapes, the 2026 survey data offer a vital dose of empirical reassurance. The findings demonstrate that regardless of partisan affiliations or intense political disagreements, the foundational commitment to peaceful civic participation remains a deeply rooted pillar of American society.
