Jono Maryono
More than five months have elapsed since Iraq’s parliamentary elections, yet the nation remains in a precarious political limbo as the Coordination Framework, the dominant bloc of Shia parties, grapples with internal power struggles that have prevented the nomination of a prime ministerial candidate. The constitutional deadline for this crucial appointment looms on April 26th, forcing Iraq to navigate a complex geopolitical landscape fraught with external pressures and internal divisions.
The incumbent Prime Minister Mohammed Shia al-Sudani is seeking a second term, but faces significant opposition from within his own coalition. A key challenge emerges from a faction led by former Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki, a figure deeply entrenched in Iraqi politics and known for his close ties to Iran. Al-Maliki’s potential candidacy is a source of considerable concern for the United States, which has publicly signaled its opposition to his return to power. This internal discord within the Coordination Framework, which commands a substantial majority of approximately 185 out of 329 seats in parliament, underscores the deep-seated rivalries and ideological differences that continue to paralyze the government formation process.
A Nation on a Tightrope: Balancing East and West
Iraq finds itself at a critical diplomatic juncture, tasked with meticulously balancing its relationships with both the United States and its influential eastern neighbor, Iran. This delicate equilibrium has been further destabilized by the escalating conflict between the US and Israel and Iran, which has increasingly spilled over into Iraqi territory. Pro-Iranian armed groups operating within Iraq have intensified their attacks on US assets, framing these actions as solidarity with Tehran. This volatile situation amplifies the urgency for a stable Iraqi government capable of asserting its sovereignty and managing these complex regional dynamics.
Iran, a nation that wields considerable influence over Iraqi political affairs, has been a significant player in the ongoing political crisis. Following the 2003 US-led military invasion that ousted President Saddam Hussein, Iran has actively cultivated relationships with various Shia parties, shaping the political landscape and fostering alliances that continue to impact the current power dynamics.
Diplomatic Maneuvers and External Influence
In a bid to break the leadership deadlock, sources indicate that Ismail Qaani, the commander of the Quds Force – the foreign operations arm of Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) – made an unannounced visit to Baghdad over the weekend. This visit, reportedly at the request of the caretaker Prime Minister al-Sudani, aimed to persuade the Coordination Framework to refrain from nominating Bassem al-Badri, a candidate seen as closely aligned with Nouri al-Maliki, for the premiership.
Falih al-Fayadh, the chairman of the Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF) and a prominent figure within al-Sudani’s Reconstruction and Development Coalition, reportedly mediated Qaani’s visit. The PMF, also known as al-Hashd al-Shaabi, is a significant paramilitary umbrella organization predominantly composed of Shia armed groups, many of whom maintain strong ties with Iran. These groups are integral to the "Axis of Resistance," a network of political and armed entities allied with Iran across the Middle East. The United States has consistently expressed concerns regarding Iran’s influence through these allied groups, citing examples such as the Houthi movement in Yemen and Hezbollah in Lebanon as prominent members of this network.
Qaani’s itinerary included meetings with Abu Fadak al-Mohammadawi, the PMF’s chief of staff, as well as al-Maliki himself, Prime Minister al-Sudani, and several other leaders of the Coordination Framework. A separate source revealed that al-Mohammadawi is actively spearheading efforts within the Framework to thwart al-Sudani’s aspirations for a second term.
"The Iranians face a bigger existential challenge – the US-Israeli war – and are not interested in settling the Iraqi PM file. They want a weak prime minister through whom they can get what they want," commented Akeel Abbas, a Washington-based researcher, shedding light on Iran’s strategic priorities.
The Legacy of Power-Sharing and the Race for the Premiership
Iraq’s post-2003 political system, characterized by a sectarian power-sharing arrangement known as "Muhasasa," has historically led to protracted negotiations and political maneuvering for key governmental posts. Under this system, the presidency is allocated to the Kurds, the speakership to Sunni Arabs, and the prime ministerial position to Shia Arabs. This framework, while intended to foster inclusivity, has often become a focal point for political bargaining and has exposed deep-seated sectarian and ethnic divisions.
The process of filling these top positions has been a drawn-out affair. On April 11th, Nizar Amedi was appointed as President after months of intense political negotiations. This appointment triggers a constitutional mandate for the Coordination Framework to nominate a prime minister within 15 days.
In response to the impending deadline, the general secretariat of the Coordination Framework has convened a crucial meeting scheduled for Monday at the residence of Ammar al-Hakim, the leader of the National State Forces Alliance, a key constituent of the Shia bloc. The sole item on the agenda is the selection of the prime ministerial candidate. However, the path to consensus remains obstructed. According to a source within the Framework, the last three meetings dedicated to this issue were postponed due to an inability among leaders to agree on a single nominee.
Internal Dynamics: The Search for a Compliant Leader
The primary objective of the Coordination Framework leaders is to identify a prime minister who will not pose a challenge to the bloc’s collective authority. Unlike al-Sudani and al-Maliki, who lead their own distinct political parties, Bassem al-Badri has emerged as a potential compromise candidate favored by many within the Framework. Al-Sudani’s Reconstruction and Development Coalition holds 46 seats in parliament, while al-Maliki’s Dawa party commands 29 seats.
Al-Badri currently serves as the head of the Accountability and Justice Commission, the body responsible for implementing de-Baathification policies, a system designed to purge former members of the Baath Party from Iraqi state institutions. This role places him in a position of significant administrative authority, yet he is perceived by some as less independently powerful than al-Sudani or al-Maliki.
Qais al-Khazali, the leader of Asa’ib Ahl al-Haq and its political wing, the Sadiqoun bloc, which holds 27 parliamentary seats within the Framework, has previously advocated for a prime minister who defers decision-making to the broader bloc. In a 2022 television interview, al-Khazali stated that the prime minister should not monopolize state decisions and must consult the Framework on all political, security, and economic matters. Al-Badri appears to align with this vision of a more subordinate prime ministerial role.
Currently, al-Badri has garnered the support of seven out of the twelve leaders within the Coordination Framework. Securing the nomination requires a two-thirds majority, or eight votes, according to internal bloc rules. The impact of Qaani’s recent visit on this fragile coalition remains uncertain.
"Al-Maliki knows he cannot pass, especially after US President Trump’s post on X," remarked Mehdi Khaz’al, a political analyst and head of the Al-Kalima Foundation for Dialogue and Development. In January, former President Donald Trump issued a stark warning, stating that Iraq would be making a "very bad choice" if it were to select al-Maliki. Trump’s statement on his Truth Social platform asserted that under al-Maliki’s leadership, the country had "descended into poverty and total chaos" and threatened that the United States would cease its aid to Iraq, warning that "if we are not there to help, Iraq has ZERO chance of Success, Prosperity, or Freedom."
Al-Maliki, who re-entered the premiership race in January, denounced Trump’s pronouncements as a "violation of Iraqi sovereignty." However, Iraqi politicians are acutely aware of the country’s precarious economic situation, particularly the impact of regional conflicts on its oil exports, making it difficult to outright dismiss such threats.
"That is why al-Maliki is backing al-Badri as an alternative candidate. But there is no winning formula inside the Framework yet, and there won’t be one until the results of the Iranian-US negotiations become clear," Khaz’al elaborated.
The US Stance: Opposition to Maliki, Ambiguity on Others
A representative from the US Embassy in Baghdad stated that the United States does not have a preferred candidate for the Iraqi premiership, with the notable exception of its firm opposition to Nouri al-Maliki. "We are committed to President Trump’s instructions, which stated clearly that the United States will halt support for Iraq if al-Maliki is elected prime minister. Otherwise, we do not have preferences on who is going to be the prime minister," the embassy official confirmed.
The US administration views al-Maliki as intrinsically linked to Iran’s network of influence and harbors concerns that his return to power would significantly undermine American efforts to curtail Iran’s regional sway. During his previous tenure as prime minister from 2006 to 2014, al-Maliki faced accusations of implementing exclusionary policies against Sunni populations, often under the pretext of de-Baathification. His sectarian political approach has been cited as a contributing factor to the rise of the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL).
Despite the clear US position, al-Maliki’s State of Law Coalition publicly maintains its commitment to his candidacy. Hisham al-Rekabi, director of al-Maliki’s office, posted on X, "The Framework’s officially announced candidate for the premiership has not been replaced. What is needed today is a clear resolution – just as the nomination was made, it can be withdrawn through the same mechanism and a new nomination can proceed without delay."
However, a source within the State of Law Coalition highlighted the intensity of American diplomatic pressure. According to this source, Tom Barrack, the US Ambassador to Turkey and special envoy to Syria, conveyed to al-Maliki that if he were to step aside, the United States would be amenable to any candidate of his choosing. "We are holding on to our right to determine the head of government," the source told Al Jazeera.
The US position on Bassem al-Badri’s candidacy remains less defined. Multiple sources within the Coordination Framework have indicated that they have not received any explicit messages from the US regarding al-Badri’s potential nomination, despite his affiliation with al-Maliki’s Dawa party and accusations that the commission he leads has applied de-Baathification measures selectively. Prior to al-Maliki’s formal nomination, the US had conveyed clear messages rejecting his candidacy. However, should Washington decide to enforce Trump’s warnings more broadly, it possesses a range of economic and diplomatic tools at its disposal.
A presidential executive order, originally issued by President George W. Bush following the Iraq War, provides legal protection to Iraqi oil revenues held at the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, safeguarding them from seizure by Iraq’s creditors. This order is slated to expire in May. If President Trump opts not to renew it, creditors could potentially pursue claims on these funds, and US courts might issue rulings to freeze Iraqi assets, thereby disrupting the flow of essential funds for public salaries and potentially paralyzing the Iraqi economy.
In a related development, the US Treasury designated seven militia commanders from Asa’ib Ahl al-Haq, Kata’ib Hezbollah, Harakat al-Nujaba, and Kata’ib Sayyid al-Shuhada on April 17th. The State Department issued a corroborating statement, an unusual step that suggests Washington’s intention to continue targeting Iran-aligned armed factions irrespective of the government formation process, and possibly to act unilaterally without direct requests from Baghdad.
Al-Sudani’s Tightrope Walk: Sovereignty and Shifting Alliances
Prime Minister al-Sudani finds himself attempting to navigate a precarious balance between Iran-backed armed factions and the US government, both of which exert significant influence over his pursuit of a second term. This balancing act, however, appears to be faltering.
In February, preceding the escalation of the US-Israeli war on Iran, al-Sudani’s caretaker government awarded contracts to the American oil company Chevron for the management of oil fields in Basra, Dhi Qar, and Salahuddin provinces. These agreements also included the transfer of management of the West Qurna-2 oil field, one of Iraq’s largest, from Russia’s Lukoil, which had withdrawn due to international sanctions. The signing ceremony was attended by Ambassador Barrack and Joshua Harris, the US charge d’affaires in Baghdad. However, these contracts remain legally non-binding as they were concluded under a caretaker administration and require ratification by a fully empowered government.
Concurrently, al-Sudani authorized the PMF to retaliate against US strikes targeting its positions and permitted militia personnel to seek refuge within Iraqi army installations, facilities that the United States had previously refrained from targeting. This dual approach has drawn criticism. The US State Department summoned Iraqi Ambassador Nizar al-Khairallah for the first time since 2003, lodging a formal protest regarding the Iraqi government’s alleged failure to protect diplomatic missions. This summons followed an unsuccessful assassination attempt on a US diplomatic convoy on April 8th, for which no group has claimed responsibility. Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, and the UAE also summoned their respective Iraqi ambassadors and issued similar protests.
"There is no legal framework for foreign officials to discuss a sovereign Iraqi matter. The Iraqi political class continuously violates the constitution. They must recommit to the constitutional path: tasking the nominee of the largest bloc within 15 days. As for trying to please the Iranians or the Americans, waiting for the outcome of a regional war to choose an Iraqi prime minister – that is disgraceful," stated Meitham al-Khalkhali, a lawyer and political analyst.
Economic Hardship for Ordinary Iraqis Amidst Political Paralysis
While Iraq’s political elite engage in complex negotiations between Tehran and Washington regarding the formation of the next government, ordinary Iraqis are grappling with escalating economic pressures that predate the current regional conflict and necessitate a fully functioning government to address effectively.
New customs tariffs, implemented on January 1st, with rates reaching as high as 30 percent on certain goods, have significantly increased the cost of imported items, ranging from household appliances and furniture to vehicles. A reinstated 20 percent sales tax on mobile phone recharge cards has further exacerbated the financial burden on citizens. In February, traders initiated nationwide strikes, closing major commercial districts in Baghdad, Basra, Mosul, and Kirkuk. Shop owners displayed banners protesting, "Customs fees are killing citizens." Traders in Mosul reported a dramatic increase in the cost of importing a single shipping container, from approximately five million dinars ($3,800) to as much as 60 million dinars ($45,662). Iraq currently bears over 90 trillion dinars ($69 billion) in debt, and its state budget remains overwhelmingly dependent on oil revenues, accounting for roughly 90 percent of its income. This economic fragility is compounded by the nation’s prolonged period without a fully empowered government for over five months.
"The sovereignty discourse adopted by the Coordination Framework loses its meaning when it is met with implicit acceptance – and sometimes direct requests – for Iranian and American influence over government formation," commented Azeez Al-Rubaye, the secretary-general of the opposition National Line movement party. "The problem is not the existence of international interests, that is an undeniable reality. The problem is the inability of domestic actors to produce an independent national formula that manages these interests without becoming their instrument," he told Al Jazeera. The prolonged political vacuum and the inability of Iraqi leaders to forge a unified national path underscore the deep challenges facing the nation as it attempts to assert its sovereignty amidst a turbulent regional environment.
