Jono Maryono
United States President Donald Trump has declared that any new nuclear agreement currently under negotiation with Iran will be "far better" than the 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), from which he unilaterally withdrew the U.S. in 2018. This assertion comes at a critical juncture, as a fragile two-week ceasefire between the U.S.-Israel coalition and Iran approaches its conclusion, casting a shadow of uncertainty over the prospect of a second round of talks scheduled to potentially convene in Islamabad, Pakistan. The evolving diplomatic landscape is underscored by the ongoing military actions and the persistent demands from the U.S. and its allies for Iran to curb its nuclear program, ballistic missile capabilities, and regional influence.
The original 2015 accord, a product of approximately two years of intricate negotiations involving hundreds of technical and legal specialists, including numerous American experts, aimed to prevent Iran from developing nuclear weapons. Under the JCPOA, Iran agreed to significant restrictions on its uranium enrichment activities and to robust international inspections in exchange for the lifting of crippling economic sanctions. However, President Trump famously derided the deal as the "worst deal ever," initiating a policy of "maximum pressure" that reimposed extensive sanctions on Tehran. This strategy was intended to compel Iran back to the negotiating table to agree to a more stringent accord, one that would also address its ballistic missile program and its support for regional armed groups.
The Genesis and Demise of the JCPOA
The JCPOA, formally agreed upon on July 14, 2015, was the culmination of intensive diplomatic efforts between Iran and the P5+1 group – the five permanent members of the UN Security Council (China, France, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States) plus Germany. The core tenet of the agreement was a quid pro quo: Iran would voluntarily curtail its nuclear program, thereby significantly reducing its capacity to produce fissile material for a nuclear weapon, while the international community would ease sanctions that had severely hampered its economy.
Specifically, Iran committed to reducing its stockpile of enriched uranium by approximately 98%, bringing it down to less than 300 kilograms. Furthermore, the enrichment level was capped at 3.67% – a level suitable for civilian power generation but far below the 90% purity required for weapons-grade uranium. Prior to the JCPOA, Iran operated around 20,000 uranium-enriching centrifuges. The deal stipulated a reduction to a maximum of 6,104 older-generation centrifuges, confined to two specific facilities and subject to stringent international monitoring by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). The JCPOA also mandated the redesign of Iran’s Arak heavy water reactor to prevent the production of plutonium, a potential pathway to nuclear weapons, and established one of the most intrusive inspection regimes ever implemented by the IAEA.
In return for these concessions, Iran anticipated substantial economic benefits, including the release of billions of dollars in frozen assets and the easing of restrictions on its oil exports and access to the global financial system. However, in May 2018, President Trump announced the U.S. withdrawal from the JCPOA, a decision met with widespread criticism from both domestic political opponents and key international allies. Despite the IAEA’s repeated confirmations that Iran was in compliance with the agreement up to that point, Trump cited Iran’s alleged support for terrorism and its regional destabilizing activities as reasons for abandoning the deal. He declared in October 2017, "The Iranian regime supports terrorism and exports violence, bloodshed and chaos across the Middle East. That is why we must put an end to Iran’s continued aggression and nuclear ambitions. They have not lived up to the spirit of their agreement."
Following the withdrawal, the Trump administration implemented a "maximum pressure" campaign, re-imposing and intensifying sanctions targeting Iran’s oil exports, shipping sector, banking system, and other vital industries. The stated objective was to cripple Iran’s economy and force it to negotiate a new, more comprehensive agreement that would include limitations on its ballistic missile program, further curbs on its nuclear activities, and enhanced scrutiny of its nuclear infrastructure.
Iran’s Nuclear Trajectory Post-JCPOA
During the period of the JCPOA’s implementation, Iran’s nuclear program was under tight constraints and intense international observation. The IAEA consistently verified Iran’s adherence to the deal’s terms. However, beginning in mid-2019, several months after the U.S. withdrawal and the re-imposition of sanctions, Iran began to incrementally breach the agreement’s limits. These breaches included exceeding established caps on uranium stockpiles and enrichment levels.
In November 2024, Iran announced its intention to activate "new and advanced" centrifuges. The IAEA subsequently confirmed that Tehran had notified the agency of its plan to install over 6,000 new centrifuges for uranium enrichment. By December 2024, reports emerged indicating that Iran was rapidly enriching uranium to a purity of 60%, a significant step closer to the 90% threshold required for weapons-grade material. Most recently, as of 2025, the IAEA estimated that Iran possessed approximately 440 kilograms of uranium enriched to 60% purity. This development has amplified concerns among international observers and has been a central point of contention in the ongoing diplomatic efforts.
Trump’s New Demands: A Broader Scope
President Trump’s current demands for a new nuclear agreement extend significantly beyond the scope of the original JCPOA. The U.S. and its key ally, Israel, are reportedly pushing for Iran to agree to a complete cessation of uranium enrichment, a demand that Iran has consistently rejected. While the U.S. and Israel have accused Iran of pursuing nuclear weapons, they have yet to publicly present concrete evidence to substantiate these claims.
A significant point of contention is Iran’s estimated 440-kilogram stockpile of 60%-enriched uranium, which the U.S. and Israel want removed from Iran. While this material is below weapons-grade, it represents a critical threshold, significantly reducing the time and effort required to achieve weapons-grade enrichment. Iran maintains that its enrichment activities are solely for peaceful, civilian purposes and points to its adherence to the 1970 Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) as evidence of its commitment to nuclear non-proliferation. Notably, in March 2025, Tulsi Gabbard, the U.S. Director of National Intelligence, testified to Congress stating that the U.S. "continues to assess that Iran is not building a nuclear weapon."
Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian, in a strongly worded statement on Sunday, asserted that President Trump has no right to "deprive" Iran of its nuclear rights, underscoring the deep divide on this issue.
Beyond Nuclear: Ballistic Missiles and Regional Influence
In addition to the nuclear program, President Trump’s agenda includes demands for severe restrictions on Iran’s ballistic missile program and an end to its support for regional proxy groups. This expanded scope represents a significant departure from the original JCPOA, which was exclusively focused on Iran’s nuclear activities.
Prior to the recent U.S.-led military actions against Iran, Tehran had consistently insisted that negotiations should be limited to its nuclear program. However, U.S. and Israeli demands have broadened considerably. Analysts suggest that the focus on ballistic missiles was partly influenced by the performance of Iranian missiles during the 12-day war between Iran and Israel in June of the previous year. Despite Israel’s sophisticated "Iron Dome" missile defense system, several Iranian missiles reportedly breached its defenses, causing a limited number of casualties but raising significant alarm within Israel. President Trump has repeatedly voiced concerns, without providing evidence, about the dangers posed by Iran’s long-range missiles, claiming they are being produced in "very high numbers" and could potentially overwhelm missile defense systems. Iran maintains that its missile capabilities are non-negotiable. While the JCPOA did not impose explicit limits on ballistic missile development, a UN Security Council resolution adopted in July 2015 did stipulate that Iran could not "undertake any activity related to ballistic missiles designed to be capable of delivering nuclear weapons."
Furthermore, the U.S. and Israel are demanding that Iran cease its support for its non-state allies across the Middle East, often referred to as Iran’s "axis of resistance." This includes groups such as Hezbollah in Lebanon, the Houthi movement in Yemen, and various militias in Iraq. In May of the previous year, during a GCC meeting in Riyadh, President Trump stated that Tehran "must stop sponsoring terror, halt its bloody proxy wars, and permanently and verifiably cease pursuit of nuclear weapons." During his State of the Union address in February, he accused Iran and its "murderous proxies" of spreading "nothing but terrorism and death and hate." Iran has consistently refused to engage in discussions about curtailing its support for these allied groups, viewing it as a sovereign matter and a key component of its regional security strategy.
Prospects for a "Much Better" Deal
The feasibility of President Trump securing a new nuclear deal that is "much better" than the JCPOA remains a subject of considerable debate. Andreas Kreig, an associate professor of Security Studies at King’s College London, suggests that a new agreement is more likely to bear a resemblance to the JCPOA, incorporating "some form of restrictions on enrichment, possibly with a sunset clause, and international supervision." He posits that Iran may secure faster access to frozen assets and a more rapid lifting of sanctions compared to the gradual approach taken under the JCPOA.
However, Kreig cautions that the political landscape in Tehran has hardened significantly since 2015. "Iran now is a far more hardline and less pragmatic player that will play hardball at every junction. Trump cannot count on any goodwill in Tehran," he stated. He further notes the increased influence of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), which wields substantial political and economic power in Iran and answers directly to the Supreme Leader.
Kreig also critically assessed the impact of the U.S.-Israel military actions against Iran, arguing that "the world is worse off than had Trump stuck to the JCPOA," even if a new compromise is eventually reached. The protracted conflict, including attacks on Iran’s nuclear sites such as Natanz, Isfahan, Arak, and Bushehr, has resulted in over 1,000 casualties since the latest war began on February 28, in addition to a prior 12-day war in June of the previous year.
Despite the challenging circumstances, Kreig believes there is still potential for a negotiated outcome if both sides moderate their demands. "Both sides can compromise on enrichment thresholds, and on temporary moratoriums on enrichments. But Iran will not surrender its sovereignty to enrich altogether, and the Trump administration will have to meet them halfway," he explained. He added that while Iran would commit on paper not to develop a nuclear weapon, it would likely seek to preserve its capabilities for research and development in this area.
Economic incentives are expected to play a crucial role in any potential agreement. Kreig anticipates that Iran will demand immediate access to capital and liquidity, an area where the Trump administration may be willing to compromise. The success of any future negotiations will hinge on the ability of both sides to navigate deeply entrenched positions and find common ground amidst a volatile geopolitical environment.
